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INTRODUCTION

While we don’t tend to think about it, healthy ecosystems provide a
variety of critical benefits. Ecosystem goods, the physical items an
ecosystem provides, are obvious. Forests provide timber; coastal marshes provide shellfish. While less visible and generally taken for
granted, the services underpinning these goods are equally important.
Created by the interactions of living organisms with their environment, ecosystem services provide the conditions and processes that
sustain human life.1 If you doubt this, consider how to grow an apple
without pollination, pest control, or soil fertility.
Once one realizes the importance of ecosystem services, three
points quickly emerge: (1) landscapes provide a stream of services
ranging from water quality and flood control to climate stability—the
economic value of which can be significant; (2) the vast majority of
these services are public goods and not exchanged in markets, so landowners have little incentive to provide these positive externalities; and
(3) we, therefore, need to think creatively about creating markets for
these services so they are not under-provided. This is the basis of the
policy approach known as Payments for Ecosystem Services (“PES”).
In its simplest form, PES is a transaction between landholders and
the beneficiaries of the services their land provides. Thus, downstream
communities might pay upper-watershed landowners to plant riparian
vegetation to ensure water quality or to halt deforestation to ensure
flood protection. Duck hunters might pay land owners to conserve
wetland habitat to support ducks and geese. Groups concerned about
climate change might pay Costa Rica to plant trees to sequester
carbon.
An obscure term just fifteen years ago, PES has come of age—
whether it is described as “natural capital,” “nature’s fortune,” or simply “investing in nature.”2 From the United Nations3 to the cover of
1. NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 3
(Gretchen C. Daily, ed., 1997).
2. GRETCHEN C. DAILY & KATHERINE ELLISON, THE NEW ECONOMY OF NATURE: THE QUEST TO MAKE CONSERVATION PROFITABLE (2002); PAUL HAWKEN,
THE ECOLOGY OF COMMERCE: A DECLARATION OF SUSTAINABILITY (2010); MARK
R. TERCEK & JONATHAN S. ADAMS, NATURE’S FORTUNE: HOW BUSINESS AND SOCIETY THRIVE BY INVESTING IN NATURE (2013).
3. The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity, U.N. ENV’T, https://www.un
environment.org/explore-topics/green-economy/what-we-do/economics-ecosystemsand-biodiversity (last visited Aug. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/PFL2-Q8AJ]; see also
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The Economist magazine,4 interest in PES has risen around the globe
and is still rising.5 There are now hundreds of PES programs around
the globe, in both developed and developing countries, with annual
transactions well over ten billion dollars.6 It has become a central
component of China’s nationwide environmental-protection strategy.7
The Obama Administration announced a federal policy to strengthen
agency mitigation policies through a “net benefit” goal.8
Industry has jumped on board the PES bandwagon. Goldman Sachs
created the Center for Environmental Markets group in 2006.9 Environmental groups have also supported this approach.10 In many PES
examples (though not all), payments take pride of place in the environmental-policy toolkit ahead of prescriptive regulations. As a result,
libertarians and property-rights advocates have taken a special interest in this strategy.11 Perhaps the greatest interest has come from the
academic community, with an explosive growth in publications over
the last two decades, as the graph below demonstrates.12
The Initiative, ECON. OF ECOSYSTEM & BIODIVERSITY, http://www.teebweb.org/about/
the-initiative/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/QAG4-UNKZ].
4. See Rescuing Environmentalism (and the Planet), ECONOMIST (Apr. 23, 2005),
http://www.economist.com/node/3888006 [https://perma.cc/BGP3-N8T6] (displaying
that week’s cover); see also Rescuing Environmentalism, ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2005),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2005/04/21/rescuing-environmentalism [https://
perma.cc/Z6MM-GE2K] (cover article).
5. See Morgan Robertson et al., Stacking Ecosystem Services, 12 FRONTIERS
ECOLOGY & ENV’T 186 (2014); see also Anne D. Guerry et al., Natural Capital and
Ecosystem Services Informing Decisions: From Promise to Practice, 112 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 7348 (2015).
6. See infra Figure 3–5.
7. Gretchen C. Daily et al., Securing Natural Capital and Human Well-Being: Innovation and Impact in China, 33 ACTA ECOLOGICA SINICA 677, 678 (2013).
8. Memorandum from the President on Mitigating Impacts on Nat. Res. from
Dev. & Encouraging Related Private Inv. (Nov. 3, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse
.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/03/mitigating-impacts-natural-resources-devel
opment-and-encouraging-related [https://perma.cc/YV8T-LH2T]. President Trump
reversed this shortly after taking office. Jim Salzman, The Overlooked Part of
Trump’s Executive Order on Climate Change, LEGAL PLANET (Apr. 6, 2017), http://le
gal-planet.org/2017/04/06/the-overlooked-part-of-trumps-executive-order-on-climatechange/ [https://perma.cc/EHF8-YPBY].
9. Environmental Market Opportunities, GOLDMAN SACHS, http://www.goldman
sachs.com/citizenship/environmental-stewardship/market-opportunities/center-for-en
vironmental-markets/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/9M3U-ZXTZ].
10. It is no coincidence that the president of The Nature Conservancy, Mark
Tercek, created and led Goldman Sachs environmental markets group prior to being
hired. Not all environmentalists, though, support the PES approach. See, e.g.,
Michelle Nijhuis, Bridging the Green Divide, NEW YORKER (Dec. 9, 2014), https://
www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/bridging-conservation-divide [https://perma.cc/
96AH-YKTX].
11. The Property and Environment Research Center, for example, has published a
number of articles on PES. See, e.g., James Salzman, Ecosystem at Your Service, 28
PROP. & ENV’T RES. CTR. 22, 24–25 (2010).
12. Google Scholar search for articles containing either terms “payments for environmental services” or “payments for ecosystem services,” screening out multiple versions of the same article. The trends from Google Scholar data were confirmed by the
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FIGURE 1
Google Scholar Search of Journal Articles Discussing PES
from 1996–2014

Promising as these developments are, the dramatic increase of interest in PES across the private and public sectors risks masking as
much as it reveals, for it tells us little about the details and evolution
of particular payment mechanisms. Put simply, does the explosive rise
in interest over PES reflect the rise of PES in the field?
Along with a few academics, I started working on this topic in the
late 1990s, publishing the first law review article on the subject.13 I
have remained active, publishing a series of articles and reports on the
legal and institutional issues involved in the creation of PES.14 While I
have been both surprised and delighted to see the field expand so rapsame search on Web of Science (which only has relevant data from 2005). See Paul J.
Ferraro, The Future of Payment for Environmental Services, 25 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1134, 1134 (2011).
13. James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887 (1997).
14. See, e.g., James Salzman, A Field of Green?: The Past and Future of Ecosystem
Services, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 133 (2006) [hereinafter Salzman, A Field of
Green?]; James Salzman, What is the Emperor Wearing?: The Secret Lives of Ecosystem Services, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 591 (2011) [hereinafter Salzman, What is the
Emperor Wearing?].

\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL106.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 5

PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES

6-DEC-18

14:53

203

idly, I am also concerned over unrealistic expectations—that the hype
may exceed the performance. Put another way, I have become increasingly worried that so many parties jumping on the PES bandwagon risks breaking the axles.
Because PES represents such a recent addition to the toolbox of
environmental-policy instruments with disparate practices at local, regional, and national levels, consistent and reliable information has
proven difficult to find. There have been plenty of individual success
stories. Perhaps the most famous is New York City’s decision to pay
communities in the Delaware and Catskills watersheds for land management practices that ensure water quality rather than investing in a
treatment plant.15 Given the choice of investing in green versus gray
infrastructure, New York City found that payment for ecosystem services was less expensive and more effective.16 Many other case studies
have been published by scholars and respected bodies such as the International Institute for Environment and Development17 and the
World Bank.18 Apart from case studies, though, it has proven hard to
find an objective, rigorous examination of PES in the field.
PES does not lack boosters. I have been among the most vocal
champions. But enthusiasm and case studies are not enough. One cannot truly assess the lessons learned from PES in the field without a
clear understanding of what actually has happened in the field. Hence
the impetus for this research project.
Working with the Ecosystem Marketplace, a non-profit group that
collects and analyzes PES transactions around the globe (and publishes its analyses on its website, ecosystemmarketplace.org), we set
out to provide the first comprehensive empirical assessment of the
state of PES mechanisms—voluntary, subsidy, and compliance—
across the domains of water, biodiversity, and carbon around the
globe. Using data collected by the Ecosystem Marketplace since 2005,
this Article moves beyond case studies and analyzes metrics on the
historical growth and current status of the many different PES sectors.
We consider the various dimensions of growth (including number of
programs, geographic spread, and dollar value) to understand better
the variety of PES mechanisms and their evolution.
15. Salzman, A Field of Green?, supra note 14, at 139–40.
16. ALBERT F. APPLETON, HOW NEW YORK CITY USED AN ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
STRATEGY CARRIED OUT THROUGH AN URBAN-RURAL PARTNERSHIP TO PRESERVE
THE PRISTINE QUALITY OF ITS DRINKING WATER AND SAVE BILLIONS OF DOLLARS 9
(2002), http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_761.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X37T-AMWT].
17. NATASHA LANDELL-MILLS & INA T. PORRAS, SILVER BULLET OR FOOLS’
GOLD?: A GLOBAL REVIEW OF MARKETS FOR FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE POOR (Mar. 2002), http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/9066IIED.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3L2H-9HH2].
18. STEFANO PAGIOLA ET AL., SELLING FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES:
MARKET-BASED MECHANISMS FOR CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2002).
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A short version of our results was published in the peer-reviewed
scientific journal, Nature Sustainability.19 This Article builds on our
Nature Sustainability piece and considers more fully the trajectories of
PES—namely, which factors have contributed to significant success
for particular PES sectors and which barriers frustrated growth. The
recent emergence of PES and the wide range of policy mechanisms
provide a particularly rich opportunity to examine the relative merits
of coercive versus market instruments. We find that PES has operated
as a carrot in some circumstances and as a stick in others.
II. WHAT

IS

PES?

While one can find isolated examples of PES from decades ago, the
current interest and rise of activity dates from the late 1990s.20 The
confluence of influential publications in scientific journals,21 books
featuring case studies of PES,22 adoption of ecosystem services as the
metric for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment,23 and the networking and research activities of groups such as Forest Trends and its
Katoomba Group quickly raised the prospect of PES as a promising
policy approach.24 The alarming trends of increasing deforestation,
rising greenhouse gases, and loss of biodiversity made clear that traditional conservation measures were proving inadequate and that additional strategies were needed.25
In economic terms, PES seeks to internalize the positive externalities generated by natural systems, creating incentives for landholder
behavior that ensures service provision.26 In some circumstances, PES
can create additional revenue streams for landholders that, on the
margin, can push land management toward conservation rather than
development.27 This approach has been described as “making trees
worth more standing than cut down.”28 It is important to recognize,
however, that PES captures only a fraction of the values provided by
19. James Salzman et al., The Global Status and Trends of Payments for Ecosystem
Services, 1 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 136 (2018).
20. See, e.g., John P. Holdren & Paul R. Ehrlich, Human Population and the
Global Environment, 62 AM. SCIENTIST 282, 282–83 (1974) (describing the importance of “natural services”).
21. Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Economic Returns from the Biosphere, 391 NATURE 629, 629 (1998); Robert Costanza et al., The Value of the World’s
Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 259 (1997).
22. DAILY & ELLISON, supra note 2, at 8, 12.
23. Overview of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM
ASSESSMENT, http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/About.html (last visited Sept.
5, 2018) [https://perma.cc/X3KH-TMME].
24. What is the Katoomba Group?, FOREST TRENDS, https://www.foresttrends.org/ecosystem_marketplace/what-is-the-katoomba-group/ (last visited Aug. 23,
2018) [https://perma.cc/BZK4-BL6K].
25. See id.
26. See Salzman, What is the Emperor Wearing?, supra note 14, at 601.
27. See id.
28. Id. at 600.
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natural systems. Existence values, option values, and many public
goods benefits are usually outside the scope of PES mechanisms.
There have been at least nine different definitions of PES proposed
in the literature.29 We take a broad view, defining it as the exchange of
value for land management practices intended to provide or ensure
ecosystem services. Researchers have also proposed different ways to
categorize the various types of approaches.30 We group PES mechanisms into three broad categories:
• Voluntary PES – Beneficiaries of ecosystem services agree to
compensate landholders for activities that maintain or enhance
ecosystem services delivery. There is no sanction for refusing to
agree to the transaction. This includes the purchase of biodiversity offsets and carbon offsets by extractive industries and companies motivated by corporate social responsibility to reduce their
habitat or climate change impacts. These are private transactions
where PES operates as a carrot.
• Subsidy PES – Public finance payments reward land managers
for enhancing or protecting ecosystem services. The buyer is a
public entity acting on behalf of the public good and not necessarily a direct beneficiary of ecosystem services enhancement or
protection. This includes government programs in Costa Rica
and China that pay landholders for reduced deforestation or afforestation activities that enhance flood protection, water quality, or other ecosystem services. Here, public funds operate as a
carrot.
• Compliance PES – Parties facing regulatory obligations compensate other parties for activities that maintain or enhance
comparable ecosystem services or goods in exchange for a standardized credit or offset that satisfies their mitigation requirements. This includes water quality trading, wetlands mitigation
banking, and the European Union’s emissions trading scheme
for greenhouse gases. Because the services are purchased as a
means of regulatory compliance, this mechanism operates as a
stick.
Within these categories, there is a wide range of specific mechanisms, reflecting the creativity of policy makers and entrepreneurs
seeking to create revenue streams for service providers. The chart below sets out some of the more common PES approaches.

29. See Sandra Derissen & Uwe Latacz-Lohmann, What are PES? A Review of
Definitions and an Extension, 6 ECOSYSTEM SERVS. 12, 12–13 (2013).
30. See, e.g., Stefanie Engel et. al, Designing Payments for Environmental Services
in Theory and Practice: An Overview of the Issues, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 663, 666–68
(2008).
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FIGURE 2
The Range of PES Mechanisms
PES Transaction Type
Public Payment for
Water Services (“PWS”)
Instream Buybacks
Trading & Offsets
Bilateral PWS
Wetland Mitigation
Biodiversity Mitigation
Voluntary Biodiversity Offsets
Compliance Forest Carbon
REDD+ Finance
Voluntary Forest Carbon
Certified Commodities

Dominant Payment
Approach

Sector
Water

Carrot
versus
Stick

Public Finance

Carrot

Bilateral Deals
Credit Trading
Bilateral Deals
Bilateral Deals
Biodiversity
Credit Trading
Bilateral Deals
Biodiversity
Credit Trading
Biodiversity Bilateral Deals
Carbon
Offset Trading
Carbon
Public Finance
Carbon
Offset Trading
All
Certification and Standards

Carrot
Stick
Carrot

Water
Water
Water

Stick
Stick
Carrot
Stick
Carrot
Carrot
Carrot

The sections that follow are set out within four basic groupings: water
PES for hydrological services such as water quality and flood control;
payments for the management and conservation of land for habitat
and for biodiversity; carbon payments for sequestration, avoided deforestation and land degradation; and bundled payments that secure
all or a combination of these services in certification of the product,
such as timber. This is followed by a discussion of lessons learned.
III. PES MECHANISMS

BY

SECTOR

A. Water
The PES water sector is the most mature in terms of the number of
programs, the ages of programs, transaction value, and geographic distribution.31 Water is the easiest context for PES because the connection between land management in an upper watershed and the direct
health benefits to downstream users appear straightforward.32 In
many cases, transaction costs are low because institutions are already
in place to collect funds from diffuse beneficiaries, whether through
water utilities, budgets of water agencies, or agricultural subsidy programs.33 The chart below describes each water PES mechanism, pro31. Salzman et al., supra note 19.
32. See id. at 137.
33. Id.
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vides an illustrative example, and provides metrics describing market
size, number of programs, and geographic diffusion (how many countries have active programs).34 This is followed by a discussion of the
key insights that emerge from a review across watershed PES.
FIGURE 3
Watershed PES35
PES
Mechanism
(Category)

Definition

Example

Market Programs
Distribution
Size 2009 2005Æ
(Countries)
Æ 2015
2015

Subsidy PWS
(governmentfinanced)

Public finance rewards
land managers for
enhancing or protecting
ecosystem services. The
funders do not directly
benefit from the
management activities.

Chinese government’s
Sloping Lands Conversion
Program pays farmers to
stop cultivating on steep
slopes. Roughly 53 million
farmers receive
compensation to improve
water quality and flood
control.

17 Æ 139, 39
$6.3
billion Æ with 69 in
China
$23.7
billion
($12.98
billion in
China).

Collective
Action PWS
(user and
governmentfinanced)

An institution pools
resources from multiple
water users (private
parties, NGOs,
government bodies) to
pay upstream landowners
for management actions
that provide water
quality and other
benefits.

Quito’s Water
Conservation Fund relies
on a 1% surcharge on
monthly water bills and
monies from local electrical
utility and beer company
directed to finance projects
protecting forests and
grasslands in the
watershed.

$402
million
Æ
$564
million

16 Æ 86

22

Bilateral PWS
(user and
governmentfinanced)

A single water user
compensates one or
more parties for activities
that deliver hydrologic
benefits to the payer or
serves to mitigate
impacts from their
activities.

In the 1990s, New York
City raised a bond to pay
for land use changes in the
Catskills and Delaware
watersheds in order to
ensure the quality of their
drinking water at much
cheaper than a treatment
plant.

$13
million
Æ
$93
million

19 Æ 111

27

Instream
Buybacks
(user and
governmentfinanced)

Water rights are
purchased or leased from
historic rights holders
and retired, which leaves
the water in-stream to
deliver water quality
benefits and ensure
healthy ecological flows.

In Australia, the Restoring
the Balance program
committed over $3 billion
over a ten-year period to
purchase water
entitlements from farmers
to ensure instream flows in
the Murray-Darling Basin.

$25
million
Æ
$60.7
million

15 Æ 20, 3
with 18 in
the USA

Quality
trading and
offsets
(compliance)

Water service providers
comply with regulations
by paying landowners for
activities that improve a
measure of water quality
(such as nutrients,
salinity, temperature,
etc.) in exchange for
credits.

In the Hunter River
Salinity Trading Scheme,
salt credits are traded
among mines and power
stations based on river
conditions to control the
salinity.

$8.3
million
Æ
$22.2
million

10 Æ 31, 3
with 29 in
the USA

34. See infra Figure 3.
35. Salzman et al., supra note 19, at 137 tbl.1.
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1. China Dominates Subsidy Payments for Watershed PES
A series of major floods and droughts in the late 1990s revealed to
the Chinese government that land degradation posed major threats to
water quality and flooding.36 China has a unique political and centralized authority that has allowed it to put PES strategies in place at a
scale and speed that would not be possible in other countries. This has
dramatically reshaped the country’s policy and physical landscape
very quickly.37
The Ecosystem Function Conservation Areas strategy, for example,
pays farmers for development restrictions on areas deemed to be important ecological or agricultural zones and, in some cases, moves the
farmers.38 The scheme’s coverage is vast, spanning roughly 40%
of China’s land area.39 The Sloping Land Conservation Program
(“SLCP”) is focused on converting steep cropland to forest and grassland while the Natural Forest Conservation Program is focused on
logging bans and afforestation. Together, they represent the largest
PES programs in the world, investing over $50 billion from 2000 to
2009.40 Indeed, the SLCP paid 32 million farmers and 120 million
households.41 Additionally, these programs have an explicit purpose
to develop rural areas.42 Scholars have found that all ecosystem services from 2000 to 2010 increased (except for biodiversity habitat)
with mostly positive socioeconomic benefits.43
Beyond water services, these programs equally serve the purpose of
rural development.44 As with most large subsidy programs, there is a
trade-off between centralized decisions for administrative feasibility
and local flexibility. Thus, most payments have been administratively
determined rather than negotiated, which can lead to inefficiencies
since payments are not tailored to local conditions.45 There have also
been concerns raised over the socioeconomic effects of these interventions.46 Nonetheless, the twin strategy of PES for conservation and
rural development remains a mainstay of Chinese policy.47

36. Jianguo Liu et al., Ecological and Socioeconomic Effects of China’s Policies for
Ecosystem Services, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 9477, 9477 (2008).
37. Salzman et al., supra note 19, at 137.
38. Liu et al., supra note 36, at 9479.
39. Salzman et al., supra note 19, at 137.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Daily et al., supra note 7, at 678.
45. See Liu et al., supra note 36, at 9481.
46. Id. at 9478.
47. Salzman et al., supra note 19, at 137.
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2. Collective Action Funds in Latin America
In order to pay upstream landowners for management actions promoting water quality, a PES water fund pools resources from multiple
water users, including private parties, NGOs, and government bodies.48 In the last decade, at least fifty-seven funds have been created.
They range widely in approaches to program size, participants, funding strategies, and forms of compensation.49 Mostly, this is due to the
Latin American Water Funds Partnership (“LAWFP”).50 LAWFP was
launched in 2011 by The Nature Conservancy, FEMSA Foundation,
InterAmerican Development Bank, and Global Environment Facility.
It has directed an estimated $27 million in leveraged start-up capital
and now has sixteen operating funds.51 The Brazilian National Water
Agency has also been active. It expanded its Water Producer program
to nineteen programs across Brazil since 2007.52
The support of first movers—the government, private sector, and
NGOs—has driven the increase by developing the institutions, expertise, and market infrastructure for watershed payments.53 Bringing together existing organizations reduces transaction costs and builds trust
more quickly.54 It also gives stakeholders a greater governing role,
identifying local champions and creating a broad base of political support.55 Continuity of funding, especially when an endowment is established, allows programs to cover their operating expenses while also
executing contracts and planning ahead.56 Taken together, these represent major advantages over bilateral and even public subsidy water
PES, many of which need to search for funding every year.
While all collective action funds share the same basic strategy of
compensating landowners for watershed management actions, it is
striking how little they share beyond that. Driven by local needs and
concerns, the wide range of approaches in program size, participants,
goals, funding sources, forms of compensation, and management activities all bear witness to the flexibility inherent in the collective action approach. Such adaptability is key to this mechanism’s success.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 138.
54. Bhim Adhikari & Arun Agrawal, Understanding the Social and Ecological
Outcomes of PES Projects: A Review and an Analysis, 11 CONSERVATION & SOC’Y
359, 368, 372 (2013).
55. Salzman et al., supra note 19, at 138.
56. Id.
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3. Instream Water and Quality Trading Require Institutional
Capacity and Secure Property Rights
Legal authority for instream flow purchases and quality trading
markets is in place in many countries around the world.57 Yet they
only operate in the United States, Mexico, and Australia.58 Despite a
constitutional provision and enabling legislation, for example, South
Africa has not been able to create a functioning system.59
Capacity has proven a major challenge. Instream buybacks need robust institutions to provide clear and enforceable property rights, an
accurate and accessible recording system, and monitoring capability to
track flows. The legal system must also recognize instream flows as a
legitimate use of water consistent with water rights. These are absent
in many countries around the world. Moreover, the over-allocation of
most river systems makes instream buybacks politically difficult because it, metaphorically, pits fish against farmers.60 At times of scarcity, absent legal requirements to maintain minimum instream flows,
conservation interests are likely to be outbid by competing urban
users, farmers and industry—the uses for water most valued by
markets.61
The weak diffusion is also due to the lack of regulatory drivers creating a solid demand for trades. Absent laws mandating a reduction in
nonpoint sources (in the case of water quality trades), aquatic ecosystem protection (in the case of instream flows), or groundwater protection (where surface flows and groundwater are closely connected),
market size will remain small and geographic reach limited.62
B. Biodiversity and Habitat
The biodiversity PES sector offsets its losses to ensure it suffers no
net loss.63 This sector is the least developed in terms of geographic
scope and the most challenging for countries to put in place.64 Unlike
in water PES, where those who receive clean water and protection
from flood are straightforward and local, the beneficiaries of biodiver57. Id.
58. Id.
59. DINEO MAILA ET AL., AN EVIDENCE-BASED APPROACH TO MEASURING THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CHANGES IN AQUATIC ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 121–23 (2017),
http://www.wrc.org.za/Knowledge%20Hub%20Documents/Research%20Reports/TT
%20726-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8UY-PRF5].
60. See, e.g., Beria Leimona, Fair Efficient, Efficiently Fair: Lessons From Designing and Testing Payment Schemes for Ecosystem Services in Asia, 12 ECOSYSTEM
SERV. 16, 21 (2015).
61. See K. William Easter et al., Formal and Informal Markets for Water: Institutions, Performance, and Constraints, 14 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 99, 111, 114
(1999).
62. Salzman et al., supra note 19, at 138.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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sity are often spread out and the specific benefits indirect or nonmaterial.65 Institutions that can collect fees for their many beneficiaries—
like water utilities—do not exist, and common metrics are difficult to
determine.66 Accordingly, there are only thirty-six countries that employ biodiversity PES programs, and the most successful initiatives
rely on regulatory drivers.67 The very practice of offsetting is controversial: It faces strong opposition from NGOs that do not wish to endorse habitat destruction.68
The compliance mitigation programs that restore stream and wetland habitat benefit from strong regulations backed by credible enforcement and common agreement on currencies of exchange (such as
wetland acreage).69 This sector is the least transparent: Data on transactions or project implementation are not available. Global transactions are estimated at $2.5–8.4 billion annually, a wide range
indicative of the difficulties in tracking payments.70

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. We do not include conservation easements or traditional conservation finance (e.g., land purchase) because many of these are made to ensure open space
rather than provision of a specific service.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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FIGURE 4
Market Size Distribution71
PES
Mechanisms
(Category)

Definitions

Example

Market
Size
2008 Æ
2016

Number of
Programs

Distributions
(Countries)

Wetlands
and Stream
Mitigation
(Compliance)

To compensate for
filling wetlands or
streams, developers
purchase credits for
comparable wetlands
and streams created
offsite that have been
certified by a
government agency.

Under the U.S. Clean
Water Act, a permit for
development of wetlands
can require the purchase of
mitigation credits from an
offsite bank of created
wetlands.

$1.3–2.2 5
billion
Æ $1.4–
6.7
billion

1

Compliance
Biodiversity
(Compliance)

To comply with
regulatory
requirements that
mitigate impacts on
biodiversity,
developers can
purchase credits for a
specific habitat type
that has already been
created by a third
party as an offset,
purchase biodiversity
credits created in a
similar manner, or pay
into a general offset
fund.

The Biodiversity Offsets
and Banking Scheme
(BioBanking) was
launched by the state of
New South Wales in 2007
to offset habitat impacts
from development.
Developers can purchase
credits from conservation
management activities such
as managing grazing,
removing invasive species,
habitat corridors, etc., for
trades that match “like for
like” credits and impact
according to the habitat
type.

99
$0.5
billion
Æ $1.1–
$1.7
billion

33

Voluntary
Biodiversity
Offsets
(GovernmentFinanced)

Developers choose to
mitigate the impacts of
projects through
measurable
conservation outcomes
intended to achieve no
net loss, or preferably
a net gain, of
biodiversity with
respect to species
composition, habitat
structure, ecosystem
function and people’s
use and cultural values
associated with
biodiversity.

$20 Æ
In Sabah, Malaysia, the
$10.5
Malua BioBank contains
one of the world’s highest million
concentrations of
orangutans. The
government of Saba
worked with private parties
to invest in the restoration
and maintenance of 34,000
hectares of rainforest. The
BioBank sells “biodiversity
conservation certificates,”
with each certificate
representing 100 square
meters of forest restoration
and protection for at least
50 years.

16
11
implemented
project sites

1. Compliance Biodiversity Requires Strong Institutional
Infrastructure
Compliance biodiversity offsets and mitigation remain important
conservation mechanisms in a small number of developed countries
but have not significantly spread to other countries. As of 2014, a full
two-thirds of the operating biodiversity offset or compensation pro71. Id. at 139 tbl.2.
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grams were concentrated in North America and Australia/New Zealand.72 There are no fully operational compliance-driven programs in
Africa.73 While the European Council adopted a 2020 Biodiversity
Strategy calling for the European Union “to ensure no net loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services,” regulations have not been produced on time and the Commission appears to favor a voluntary
rather than regulatory approach.74 The United Kingdom has similarly
backed off mandating offsets in favor of voluntary schemes.75 These
concerns over the effect offset rules could have on development suggest that many nations will continue to favor voluntary approaches.
For those countries serious about compliance offsets, patience will
be important. The United States and Australia have the most developed programs and it has taken them several decades to develop the
suite of policy measures, tools, and information needed to operate effectively.76 Creating similar capacity in other countries will take time,
and it will likely be infeasible in most developing countries, particularly in those regions of the world with much of the global
biodiversity.
2. Voluntary Biodiversity Offsets Remain an Emerging Approach
Because voluntary biodiversity offsets are a very recent policy development and were largely unknown just a decade ago, they generally take the form of one-off projects undertaken by companies for
reasons ranging from social corporate responsibility to risk management. Without regulatory requirements, this approach rests on developing a persuasive business case for voluntary offsets and will be
driven by how many companies engage in pilot projects and incorporate offsets into company policy. To date, the number of projects remains small, particularly those with independent verification.
72. Genevieve Bennett et al., State of Biodiversity Markets 2017: Markets and
Compensation for Global Intrastate Development, FOREST TRENDS 24, 26 (Oct. 2017),
https://www.forest-trends.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/doc_5707.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7ZTA-FY2C].
73. Becca Madsen et al., State of Biodiversity Markets: Offset and Compensation
Programs Worldwide, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE 33 (2010), http://www.foresttrends.org/documents/files/doc_2388.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWK9-VLJM]. South Africa is close. While its Environmental Impact Assessment regulations provide for
some compensation for biodiversity loss, it does not implement a mitigation hierarchy
or attempt to achieve no net loss, like-for-like, or any other spatially relevant compensatory mitigation. Id. at 33–34, 36.
74. EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020, EUR. UNION 5 (Jun. 23, 2011), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&fST%2011978%202011%20INIT [https://
perma.cc/7YPP-HAA5]; Our Life Insurance, Our Natural Capital: An EU Biodiversity
Strategy to 2020, EUR. COMMISSION 9, 12 (Mar. 5, 2011), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal
-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0244&from=EN [https://perma.cc/NT
R9-WZUS].
75. Bennett et al., supra note 72, at 49.
76. Id. at 4.
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Much will depend on better understanding of the costs involved.
Designing, implementing, and monitoring biodiversity offsets can be
resource-intensive. The very practice of offsets remains both challenging and controversial, with strong opposition to biodiversity and carbon offsets from NGOs worried about endorsing habitat destruction
and harming local communities dependent on the areas affected by
development.77
If properly designed and implemented, voluntary offsets have the
potential to protect and restore more than is harmed, creating a net
positive gain for biodiversity conservation, and governments in developing countries remain interested in the potential for private sources
of conservation funding and developing pilot projects. The Business
and Biodiversity Offsets Program’s development of standards in 2012
created a common text and set of expectations. But much work still
remains to bridge this gap between policy and implementation
capacity.
3. Access to Capital an Important Factor for Voluntary
Offset Uptake
In 2012, the International Finance Corporation revised its Performance Standard 6.78 Projects above $10 million must put in place mitigation measures for their impacts on natural habitat “designed to
achieve no net loss of biodiversity where feasible.”79 When working in
critical habitat, mitigation should “achieve net gains of those biodiversity values for which critical habitat was designated.”80 Similar standards have been adopted by the Equator Principles, a voluntary code
of conduct for over eighty of the world’s largest banks, the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the European Investment
Bank, and the World Bank’s Operational Policy 4.04.81 Taken to77. See Chris Lang, More than 80 NGOs Oppose Aviation Sector’s Carbon Offsetting Plans, REDD-MONITOR (April 4, 2016), https://redd-monitor.org/2016/04/04/
more-than-80-ngos-oppose-aviation-sectors-carbon-offsetting-plans/ [https://perma.cc/
GY9P-8WJ7]; Chris Lang, No to Biodiversity Offsetting, REDD-MONITOR (Nov. 22,
2013), https://redd-monitor.org/2013/11/22/no-to-biodiversity-offsetting/ [https://
perma.cc/KM32-QEEC].
78. Performance Standard 6, WORLD BANK (Jan. 1, 2012), https://www.ifc.org/wps/
wcm/connect/bff0a28049a790d6b835faa8c6a8312a/PS6_English_2012.pdf?
MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/N5V6-PQQE].
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. The Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://equator-principles.com/
about/195/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7JMK-BLDX]; Christopher
Wright, European Investment Bank: Promoting Sustainable Development, “Where Appropriate”, CCE BANKWATCH NETWORK 6 (Nov. 2007), https://bankwatch.org/docu
ments/EIB_where_appropriate.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE96-YJ7D]; Equator Principles
Financial Institutions, WORLD BANK, https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_
ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability-at-ifc/company-resources/sus
tainable-finance/equator+Principles+Financial+Institutions (last visited Sept. 8, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/BMY7-TNQT].
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gether, these financial institutions provide capital for a significant
amount of development activity that impacts habitats around the
world. This should significantly increase the number of projects with
no net loss conditions. Because the standards are so recent, however,
it is not yet clear whether they will be strictly implemented and, therefore, drive the demand for voluntary offsets.
4. Mitigation Credit Banks are Growing but Only in Developed
Countries
Compensatory mitigation banking continues to grow: Transactions
are estimated at $3.6 billion per year.82 But it has not spread geographically. Almost all the growth has only occurred in countries
where wetlands are the largest habitat type offset: The United States,
Australia, Canada, and Germany.83 Mitigation banking is found in developed countries except in a few limited circumstances. It has been
introduced in Malaysia on a voluntary basis, in Northern Mariana Islands for compliance purposes, and is in the process of being piloted in
Colombia.84 In developing countries, permittee-responsible mitigation—mitigation by the impacting party or a subcontractor—is the
most commonly found option for compliance. However, many countries (including Brazil, Cameroon, China, Colombia, Egypt, India,
Mozambique, and South Africa) allow developers to compensate in
lieu of offsetting, which is generally used to fund conservation projects
by the public sector or an NGO.85
Mitigation banks take on the risks and complexity of undertaking
an offset from developers.86 Large mitigation banks can achieve economies of scale in design, maintenance, and monitoring. This enables
them to protect larger, contiguous areas that offer better ecological
payoff than smaller, isolated permittee-responsible mitigation
projects.87 An effective mitigation system requires laws, monitoring of
compliance, and tough enforcement.88 But transparency can be a
problem.89 Despite the market’s size, data on credit prices is hard to
find, and relatively little market infrastructure (like brokerages, accounting services, and standards) has emerged compared to newer
markets like carbon.90 It also remains unclear whether the currency of
exchange adequately reflects ecosystem service values and can meaningfully ensure no net loss.91
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Salzman et al., supra note 19, at 138.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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C. Forest Carbon
Of all PES sectors, the forest and land use carbon market has received the most attention.92 It is a policy instrument to combat climate
change, and since 2009, it has spent $2.8 billion for forestry and land
use practices that sequester carbon and quantify its benefits in a standardized offset.93 Over the past twenty years, markets and funding
mechanisms for climate mitigation have emerged all over the globe—
for example, purely voluntary exchanges (CCX), international funding mechanisms (BioCarbon Fund), state mandates (California’s AB32), and international treaty flexibility mechanisms (CDM).94 Taken
together, these and others represent many different approaches in the
private and public sectors.95 As with any experiments, some have succeeded and others have not, but they continue to rapidly evolve and
adapt.96
The Paris Agreement endorsed continued market development and
introduced the term “Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes.”97 The four major sources for forest and land use carbon offsets are afforestation/reforestation, improved forest management
(“IFM”), sustainable agricultural land management, and reduced
emissions from land use and forest degradation (“REDD”), which
may include afforestation/reforestation, IFM, or agricultural
interventions.98

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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FIGURE 5
Forest and Land Use Carbon PES
PES
Mechanisms
(Category)

Definitions

Example

Market Size
2008 Æ 2016

Number
Distributions
of
(Countries)
Programs

Voluntary
Forest and
Land-Use
Carbon Market
(UserFinanced)

Buyers willingly
purchase offsets
outside of
government
regulation – though
“pre-compliance”
demand anticipating
regulation counts as
voluntary.

Companies such as
Microsoft, Disney, and
Natura Cosméticos
voluntarily purchase
forest carbon offsets to
meet corporate social
responsibility
commitments.

$46 million
N/A
(2009) Æ
$74.2 million
(2016)

67

Compliance
Forest Carbon
Market
(Compliance)

Regulation on
greenhouse gas
emissions, typically
through cap-andtrade, allows forest
carbon sequestration
or avoided
deforestation to
provide offsets for
emissions.

California’s cap-andtrade program, launched
in 2013, includes U.S.
forestry as one of its
offset protocols.

$5 million
(2009) Æ
$551.4
million
(2016)

4 (2009)
Æ17
(2016)

8

REDD
Readiness
Finance
(GovernmentFinanced)

Mechanism under the
UNFCCC where
developing tropical
forest countries
receive payments
from countries for
implementing
activities that avoid
deforestation and
maintain carbon
stocks in standing
forests.

The World Bank Forest
Carbon Partnership
Facility Readiness Fund
provides support to
countries preparing to
receive REDD+
payments, including
development of national
REDD+ strategies,
systems for monitoring,
reporting, and
verification, and
reference emission
levels.

$3.2 billion
(2009) Æ
$8.1 billion
(2014)

28 (2014)

28 (2014)

Public Sector
Payments for
Performance
(GovernmentFinanced)

Developed countries
may agree to pay
developing countries
for reducing
deforestation
(REDD), with
payments flowing
once results are
achieved.

Norway pledged $1B to
Brazil’s Amazon Fund to
reduce its deforestation
rate. Because Brazil has
reduced deforestation
more than 80% since
2004, most of the money
has been disbursed.

$2.9 billion
committed,
$218 million
disbursed
(2014)

3
3 disbursed,
disbursed 23 pending
(2014)
funds
(2014)

1. Supply Exceeds Demand for Voluntary Forest Carbon
The number of voluntary projects has steadily continued to grow
with billions of dollars flowing toward REDD-preparedness.99 Forest
carbon has been the dominant project type on the voluntary market
for the last two years, surpassing renewable energy. Nonetheless, demand remains a small fraction of the available supply for carbon
offsets.100
99. See id. at 138.
100. Id.
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2. Compliance Carbon Markets Have had Limited Impact
Neither the Clean Development Mechanism nor the European
Union Emissions Trading Scheme has invested very much in forest
conservation.101 California’s Air Resources Board has been more
helpful to these project types: 65% of all offsets it issued as of 2017
were from forestry and land use projects.102 But volumes transacted in
2016 (4.1 million tCO2e) were still relatively small compared to overall
offsets market activity. Further, the requirement that all offset
projects be United States-based (excluding Hawaii and certain regions
in Alaska) limits potential for scale.103 The importance of forests in
mitigating climate change was explicitly addressed in the Paris Agreement, but there have not yet been negotiations resulting in agreement
on the role for forest and land-use carbon offsets in meeting emissions
reduction targets.104
3. The Treatment of REDD in the UNFCCC Negotiations
Will be Critical
Funding for REDD+ and REDD Readiness (building capacity to
accept payments for performance) has dominated the PES carbon sector.105 Developed countries have pledged over $8 billion for REDD
Readiness through 2020 (46% from Norway) to sixty-seven tropicalforest countries and pledged almost $3 billion for actual emissions reductions.106 Disbursing funds has been a slow process: As of 2017,
only $218 million had been paid to countries for emissions reductions.107 Without REDD+, the prospects for forest carbon PES are
diminished.108
Without REDD, the prospects for forest carbon PES are likewise
diminished.109 The recent Paris Agreement endorsed the REDD+ approach, but due to the focus on Nationally Determined Contributions,
it is uncertain how many national and subnational programs will accept REDD+ credits from other countries for compliance obligations
unless there are clear and widely adopted international guidelines
concerning measurement, verification, and reporting.110
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 138–39.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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D. New Horizons: Agricultural Commodities
Large-scale agriculture and unsustainable forest practices are responsible for roughly two-thirds of tropical deforestation and significant biodiversity loss.111 Most of these impacts arise from the
production of a small number of commodities—palm oil, soy, cattle,
timber, and pulp—in developing countries (which account for 70% of
the world’s soy and all of its palm oil).112 These commodities were
valued at $98 billion of agricultural exports in 2013 and provide ingredients for hundreds of millions of consumer products, from candy bars
to soaps, and account for a large part of supply chains’ greenhouse gas
emissions.113 Maintaining these trade flows is critical to sustaining
tropical countries’ continued development.
An increasing number of actors throughout the supply chain have
publicly committed to reduce the ecosystem impacts of the commodities that they produce or procure. These commitments vary enormously—by level of stringency, breadth of coverage, length of
obligation, and many other sourcing characteristics. Established commodity groups such as the Forest Stewardship Council, Roundtable
for Responsible Soy, and the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil
provide a forum for hundreds of companies to engage in stakeholder
dialogues and develop reporting and certification standards.114 In sum,
commitments have come from companies exceeding $4 trillion in market capitalization.115 Over 30% of these commitments were made in
2014.116
Because there has been no effective standardization of definitions
or performance verification, it is difficult to compare across commitments. Two-thirds of the parties work within certifications systems,
with the remaining outside standardized verification frameworks. And
some companies go above and beyond the certification requirements
in their commitment.
Certified commodities represent the most significant new opportunity for PES. This represents a major shift from ten and twenty years
ago, when the push for certification primarily came from consumers.
Now major retailers and suppliers are taking the lead. While a welcome development, this poses significant challenges.
Ensuring traceability requires mapping thousands of supply chains
from farm and production to suppliers and retailers. Companies set111. MOLLY PETERS-STANLEY ET AL., SUPPLY CHANGE: CORPORATIONS, COMCOMMITMENTS THAT COUNT 7 (Mar. 2015), https://forest-trends.org//
wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Supply-Change_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM8GTKHZ].
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 11.
115. Id.
116. Id.
MODITIES, AND
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ting their own goals may be engaged in greenwashing, so how can
credibility be ensured? Certification organizations have an incentive
to ensure others are complying with their standards, but they face a
significant conflict of interest. Enforcing their standards too strictly
may lead to a decrease in users, and significant monitoring costs may
prove too expensive. There is therefore a need for an independent
institution to ensure the systems’ credibility.
IV. ASSESSING

THE

EFFECTIVENESS

OF

PES

The preceding sections set out the most comprehensive assessment
to date of PES in terms of geographic coverage, number of programs,
value of transactions, and rates of growth. These metrics do not, however, answer the fundamental question of PES’s effectiveness. Put
simply, has PES delivered in terms of service provision (a biophysical
measure), efficiency (an economic measure), or improvement of social
welfare (such as poverty reduction, gender equity, securing property
rights, etc.)?
Perhaps surprisingly, for the vast majority of programs we simply do
not know. Reviews have consistently lamented the lack of data on the
effectiveness of PES.117 As Pattanayak et al. reported in 2010, “[w]e
do not yet fully understand either the conditions under which PES has
positive environmental and socioeconomic impacts or its costeffectiveness.”118 A recent review in Science reached the same
conclusion.119
Like most conservation programs (public or private), few PES
schemes have been established with evaluation in mind. As a result,
researchers studying them at a later date have had no baseline data,
control areas, or randomized design, making it difficult to evaluate
counter-factuals—what would have happened without a PES program?120 Some scholars have applied matching or difference-in-difference methods of analysis to address this problem,121 while others have
relied on proxy measures (such as acres under contract) assumed to
117. Roy Brouwer et al., Meta-Analysis of Institutional-Economic Factors Explaining the Environmental Performance of Payments for Watershed Services, 38 ENVTL.
CONSERVATION J. 380, 388 (2011); Daniela A. Miteva et al., Evaluation of Biodiversity Policy Instruments: What Works and What Doesn’t?, 28 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL’Y 69, 85–86 (2012).
118. Subhrendu K. Pattanayak et al., Show Me the Money: Do Payments Supply
Environmental Services in Developing Countries?, 4 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 254,
268 (2010).
119. S. Naeem et al., Get the Science Right When Paying for Nature’s Services: Few
Projects Adequately Address Design and Evaluation, 347 SCI. 1206, 1206 (2015).
120. Paul J. Ferraro et al., Estimating the Impacts of Conservation on Ecosystem
Services and Poverty By Integrating Modeling and Evaluation, 112 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. U.S. 7420, 7421 (2015).
121. Miteva et al., supra note 117, at 73; Paul J. Ferraro & Merlin M. Hanauer,
Advances in Measuring the Environmental and Social Impacts of Environmental Programs, 39 ANN. REV. ENV’T RES. 495, 504 (2014).
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correlate with ecosystem service provision.122 Moreover, much of the
literature has relied on case studies, introducing problems of selection
bias.123 The paragraphs below summarize effectiveness scholarship for
the different types of PES schemes.
Empirical studies on the effectiveness of forest PES, largely in
Costa Rica and Mexico, have reported mixed results for reduced deforestation, depending on the time period and area.124 Researchers
highlighted concerns over additionality: That PES contracts are often
established on low-value lands unlikely to be converted to other
uses125—and leakage—that avoided deforestation in the PES area
leads to increased logging in other areas.126
Robust studies on the effectiveness of forest certification programs
are also lacking. A 2016 review by Heilmayr and Lambin concluded
that “[p]revious assessments generally failed to meet basic standards
of rigor such as comparison to a credible control.”127 Lambin et al.
similarly concluded that “few studies have tried to measure the producer-level environmental effects of eco-certification, and even fewer
have overcome the methodological challenges.”128 There has been evidence, though, of localized qualitative benefits such as clarification
and security of land tenure, greater levels of compliance, and increased social capital.129
Miteva et al. reported little causal evidence on the effectiveness of
conservation instruments in developing countries.130 Their review of
PES schemes (all in Latin America) found reduced deforestation and
increased reforestation, but none of the studies considered the impact
on forest quality.131 Gullison reported that forest certification generated biodiversity benefits but questioned whether they would be sufficient to protect high conservation value forests.
122. Ferraro et al., supra note 120, at 7420.
123. Kathy Baylis et al., Mainstreaming Impact Evaluation in Nature Conservation,
9 CONSERVATION LETTERS 58, 60 (2015).
124. Ferraro et al., supra note 120, at 7422.
125. G. Arturo Sanchez-Azofeifa et al., Costa Rica’s Payment for Environmental
Services Program: Intention, Implementation, and Impact, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1165, 1172 (2007).
126. Jennifer M. Alix-Garcia et al., Forest Conservation and Slippage: Evidence
from Mexico’s National Payments for Ecosystem Services Program, 88 LAND ECON.
613, 613 (2012).
127. Robert Heilmayr & Eric F. Lambin, Impacts of Nonstate, Market-Driven Governance on Chilean Forests, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 2910, 2910 (2016).
128. Eric F. Lambin et al., Effectiveness and Synergies of Policy Instruments For
Land Use Governance in Tropical Regions, 28 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 129, 133
(2014).
129. Michael Richards, What Do We Know About Gender and Other Social Impacts
of IWS Projects?: A Literature Review, FOREST TRENDS 2 (May 2013), https://
www.forest-trends.org/wp-content/uploads/imported/literature-review_gender-andsocial-impacts_pws-projects_9-19-13-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7K5-STDG].
130. Miteva et al., supra note 117, at 86.
131. Id. at 77–78.
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There is a large literature on water PES schemes. A 2011 review of
forty-seven schemes by Brouwer et al. found that 58% had been “classified as effective in reaching their environmental objectives, while
42[%] were not.”132 Reflecting the massive scale of recent Chinese
watershed PES programs, an increasing number of studies have
started to assess these initiatives.133
A small number of PES programs, such as South Africa’s Work for
Water Program, have explicit poverty alleviation goals.134 Some studies of PES watershed schemes have found positive welfare impacts for
PES participants, with increased household income,135 but the overall
record has not demonstrated strong positive or negative impacts on
poverty.136 Samii et al. conducted a thorough review on the link between forest PES and poverty, reporting that there is “little reason for
optimism for current PES approaches to achieve both conservation
and poverty reduction benefits jointly.”137
While there is a large body of research on the social welfare impacts
of the Clean Development Mechanism, most of these are not PES
projects.138 PES impacts on gender remain largely unstudied.139
A number of researchers have raised equity concerns created by
PES programs. Bennett described problems with lack of voluntary
participation in China’s Sloping Land Conversion Program.140 Rodrı́guez de Francisco et al. charged that PES reinforced existing social
differences.141 The most critical literature has focused on REDD initiatives, though most of these articles have been qualitative or predic132. Roy Brouwer et al., supra note 117, at 387.
133. Hau Zheng et al., Benefits, Costs, and Livelihood Implications of a Regional
Payment for Ecosystem Service Program, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 16681,
16681 (2013).
134. J.K. Turpie et al., The Working for Water Programme: Evolution of a Payments
for Ecosystem Services Mechanism That Addresses Both Poverty and Ecosystem Service Delivery in South Africa, 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 788, 794 (2008).
135. Johannes Alexeew et al., An Analysis of the Relationship Between the Additionality of CDM Projects and Their Contribution to Sustainable Development, 10
INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS 233, 239 (2010).
136. Id.; Pattanayak et al., supra note 118, at 261.
137. Cyrus Samii et al., Effects of Payment for Environmental Services (PES) on
Deforestation and Poverty in Low and Middle Income Countries: A Systematic Review,
CAMPBELL SYSTEMATIC REVS. 7 (Dec. 19, 2014), https://campbellcollaboration.org/
effects-of-payment-for-environmental-services-pes-on-deforestation-and-poverty-inlow-and-middle-income-countries-a-systematic-review/download/537_5c7e18d9f0ce44
f295c745d36998793a.html [https://perma.cc/B22P-3Z6Q].
138. See generally Alexeew et al., supra note 135; Emily Boyd et al., Reforming the
CDM for Sustainable Development: Lessons Learned and Policy Futures, 12 ENVTL.
SCI. & POL’Y 820; Tracey L. Crowe, The Potential of the CDM To Deliver Pro-Poor
Benefits, 13 CLIMATE POL’Y 58 (2013).
139. Heilmayr & Lambin, supra note 127, at 2913.
140. Michael Bennprat, China’s Sloping Land Conversion Program: Institutional
Innovation or Business as Usual? 65 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 699, 707 (2008).
141. Jean Carlo Rodrı́guez de Francisco et al., Payment for Environmental Services
and Unequal Resource Control in Pimampiro, Ecuador, 26 SOC’Y NAT. RESOURCES
1217, 1229 (2013).
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tive.142 Empirical research has typically found little or only slightly
positive social effects.143
Viewed overall, there has been scant impact evaluation of PES in
the field. This prevents meaningful analysis of the effectiveness of
PES or strategies to maximize the delivery of services and related benefits. Given the scale of current PES transactions and their likely increase, the weak state of assessment will prove problematic if program
critics begin to challenge whether funds have been spent effectively.
Addressing this gap will require much more intentional design of PES
at the outset to collect relevant data and test hypotheses.
V. LESSONS LEARNED
While the well-known PES success stories continue to generate enthusiasm and interest for PES approaches, a close examination of the
experiences to date of the many types of PES mechanisms suggests a
more nuanced picture. A small number of PES mechanisms account
for the majority of growth in number, volume of transactions, size of
transactions, and geographic spread. The key questions are: (1) Why
have some programs grown to scale while others have not? (2) What
does this tell us about the broader issue of instrument choice in environmental protection? We suggest these can be addressed through focusing on four key factors—motivated buyers, motivated sellers,
metrics, and low transaction cost institutions.
A. Motivated Buyers
As with all exchanges, PES is driven by demand—i.e., the perceived
scarcity of ecosystem services. People do not buy what they feel they
do not need. In the PES arena, the scarcity may concern water quality,
flood protection, climate stability, or biodiversity. If a service is not
scarce (or is simply taken for granted), there is no evident need to pay
for it. Many PES mechanisms are purely private—e.g., duck hunters
pay farmers to keep grain on their fields or flood them, and cities pay
upper-watershed land owners to keep trees standing rather than de142. See, e.g., Patrick Bottazzi et al., Carbon Sequestration in Community Forests:
Trade-offs, Multiple Outcomes and Institutional Diversity in the Bolivian Amazon, 45
DEV. & CHANGE 105 (2014); Jan Börner et al., Direct Conservation Payments in the
Brazilian Amazon: Scope and Equity Implications, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1272
(2009); Michael Huettner, Risks and Opportunities of REDD+ Implementation for
Environmental Integrity and Socio-Economic Compatibility, 15 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 4
(2011).
143. Rohit Jindal et al., Reducing Poverty Through Carbon Forestry? Impacts of the
N’hambita Community Carbon Project in Mozambique, 40 WORLD DEV. 2123, 2123
(2012); Mohan Poudel et al., Social Equity and Livelihood Implications of REDD+ in
Rural Communities—A Case Study from Nepal, 9 INT’L J. COMMONS 177, 177 (2015);
T.N. Maraseni et al., An Assessment of the Impacts of the REDD+ Pilot Project on
Community Forests User Groups (CFUGs) and Their Community Forests in Nepal,
136 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 37, 37 (2014).
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velop. Landholders can choose to enter into these transactions or not.
The challenge is that many ecosystem services are public goods whose
benefits cannot easily be captured by discrete parties. As a result,
complete reliance on private PES transactions will prove insufficient
in many settings to ensure the socially optimal level of service
provision.
We currently see this challenge playing out in the domain of climate
change. Private markets do not internalize the negative costs of greenhouse gas emissions (also known as the social cost of carbon144) that
result indirectly in harms such as the extended droughts in California
or more frequent and powerful hurricanes in the Atlantic.145
PES instrument design addresses this issue by stimulating transactions through regulation that creates demand. This prevents free-riding and overcomes the collective action costs of organizing diffuse
beneficiaries. It is thus no surprise that many of the largest PES programs are all based on transactions mandated by compliance PES,
such as mitigation banking. This also explains why the PES mechanisms of compliance biodiversity, instream flow, and water quality
markets remain limited to a small number of countries. The necessary
governance capacity of laws and institutions to create regulatory demand is absent in most countries.
B. Motivated Sellers
If PES payments are to provide services, then landowners must be
paid, and their behavior must be sufficient to provide the desired service. Moreover, the amount paid to landowners must be competitive
with the opportunity costs. Put another way, PES on its own will make
trees more valuable standing than cut down only if the service payments to economically-motivated landowners are as attractive as the
value of timber. But in many settings, the revenue streams from PES
will not change landowners’ behavior and may need to be bolstered by
regulation or other strategies.
This, too, suggests limits to purely private markets. If a significant
part of the service’s value lies outside the transaction (or the collective
action costs of organizing payments from beneficiaries are high), then
we should not expect to see large and growing PES markets. The data
supports this. Wetlands provide important protection against flooding
and storm surges. This was evident recently in Houston but more dra144. The Social Cost of Carbon: Estimating the Benefits of Reducing Greenhouse
Gas Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://19january2017snapshot.
epa.gov/climatechange/social-cost-carbon_.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/7BP6-5CCU].
145. Scott Waldman, Global Warming Tied to Hurricane Harvey, SCI. AM. (Dec. 14,
2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/global-warming-tied-to-hurricaneharvey/ [https://perma.cc/EU33-KDF4].
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matically with Hurricane Katrina.146 In neither case, however, did private markets emerge to conserve wetlands for their flood protection
services. The most important instruments for wetlands conservation
are regulatory, most notably the Section 404 program under the Clean
Water Act.147 This has spurred the growth of mitigation bankers who
now provide credits for wetlands habitat. Even here, though, there is
often a mismatch between where the mitigation takes place (generally
far from the development impact) and where the service provision
would be most valuable.148
One can also stimulate service provision with subsidies such as watershed PES financed through water utility bills or government payments. A key practical challenge for subsidy programs, though, lies in
identifying those landholders that are most important for service provision. This requires an assessment mechanism to ensure the funds are
spent most efficiently. There is no real benefit in paying everyone to
conserve wetlands. The focus should be on wetlands with the potential
to provide the greatest level of storm water protection. Most subsidy
programs, however, do not condition payments on service provision
capacity, either because of the transaction costs or concern over
achieving the dual goal of poverty alleviation.149
C. Metrics
Because PES is, by definition, an exchange of value for services,
how the service should be measured is of prime importance.150 Most
PES transactions do not resemble markets in the sense of competing
buyers and sellers.151 True PES markets only occur in the shadow of
regulation: They are only feasible where metrics are easily obtained
and services are fungible, like the carbon compliance market in California, which trades in offset credits equivalent to one ton of carbon
dioxide equivalent emissions.152 Wetland and stream mitigation programs also provide low-cost metrics, defining credits in terms of wetland area and linear stream habitat lost or restored, often with
additional quality weightings.153 These are proxies, however, and it remains contested how accurately they capture service provision.154
146. Edward B. Barbier, Hurricane Katrina’s Lessons for the World, 524 NATURE
285, 285 (2015).
147. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
148. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Effects of Wetland Mitigation Banking on
People, 28 NATL. WETLANDS NEWSL. 1, 1, 8 (2006).
149. Stefanie Engel, The Devil in the Detail: A Practical Guide on Designing Payments for Environmental Services, 9 INT’L R. ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 131, 151
(2016).
150. Salzman et al., supra note 19, at 140.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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Metrics present more definition and exchange problems once one
moves to biodiversity and habitat, as seen by the difficulty in practically defining “no net loss.”155
The choice of metrics presents a tension—easily assessed metrics
reduce transaction costs and facilitate exchanges, but they risk missing
what really matters and may not actually align with conservation
goals.156 More rigorous metrics, by contrast, may accurately capture
service values but be so unwieldy that transaction costs become
prohibitive.157
D. Low-Transaction Cost Institutions
As a practical matter, a PES program requires a group of discrete
buyers to buy a service and a set of discrete sellers to be paid.158 Thus,
there must be an efficient way to collect and distribute funds.159 This is
fundamental to the success of many watershed PES programs.160
Water utilities already collect fees from those to whom they provide
water.161 Because no individual negotiation is necessary, the transaction costs are small.162
Aside from services with clear and localized benefits, such as water
purification and flood protection, two institutional problems remain.163 First, ecosystem services are often subject to the domains of
different agencies and political jurisdictions. This creates high transaction costs, as the different regimes must be mediated.164 Second, there
is a problem of diffuse beneficiaries.165 If everyone benefits from a
public good, such as biodiversity or carbon sequestration, then effectively no one can be charged.166 Philanthropic institutions such as the
World Wildlife Fund or the Norwegian government’s foreign aid for
REDD help overcome these hurdles by aggregating demand on behalf
of the public, but freeriding remains a problem.167
With these factors in mind, it is obvious why the scaling up of subsidy watershed PES has been a successful strategy in terms of value,
growth, and geographic reach.168 Buyers are motivated to protect watershed because of the clear relationship between watershed protec155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 140–41.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tion and water quality.169 It is easy to identify upper-watershed
landowners and pay them to change their management practices.170
The clear metrics for implementation are based on restrictions on development and can be monitored at a low cost.171 Additionally, water
utilities already collect fees from beneficiaries and pay suppliers.172
Voluntary biodiversity PES, at the other extreme, generally lacks all
of these attributes.173
VI.

CONCLUSION

Taken together, PES programs in water, carbon and habitat/biodiversity represent significant policy instruments across the globe,
with total transaction value in each sector in the billions of dollars.
While there is significant heterogeneity, a small number of PES approaches account for the majority of growth in each sector. Water PES
dominates in terms of transaction value, number of programs, and geographic spread. Forest carbon PES continues to grow, but biodiversity PES has remained small in terms of value and diffusion.
Certification for the major agricultural commodities that drive deforestation represents the greatest emerging opportunity for new and significant PES growth, but credibility and transparency present major
challenges.
Simply because certain types of PES are unlikely to scale up does
not mean they should be regarded as failures. In many parts of the
world where conservation is most under threat, alternatives to PES
may be infeasible and the preconditions for large-scale PES absent.
As a result of weak governance capacity, regulation and credible enforcement may not be options. In those settings, PES mechanisms,
even if operating at small scale, may represent the most promising
“second-best” conservation strategy.
In practice, PES represents a rich blend of carrots and sticks and of
private transactions and regulation. Those services that are primarily
public goods, where private benefits cannot be captured easily, regulation and subsidy instruments dominate. In settings where service provision provides significant private benefit or where consumers view
service provision as an important aspect of the social license to operate, then purely private and non-governmental transactions dominate.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
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